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openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c

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/*
* Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "statem_local.h"
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
if (!s->renegotiate)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
/* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
strlen(s->ext.hostname))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
/*-
* 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
* 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
/* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
/* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
/* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
{
int i, end, ret = 0;
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
size_t num_groups, j;
/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
return 0;
cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
|| c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
ret = 1;
break;
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
if (!ret)
return 0;
/* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) {
uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j];
if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const unsigned char *pformats;
size_t num_formats;
if (!use_ecc(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
/* Sub-packet for formats extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
size_t num_groups = 0, i;
if (!use_ecc(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*
* Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
*/
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
/* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* Copy curve ID if supported */
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
size_t ticklen;
if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
&& s->session->ext.tick != NULL
&& s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
} else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
&& s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
} else {
ticklen = 0;
}
if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
size_t salglen;
const uint16_t *salg;
if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
/* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/* Sub-packet for the actual list */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
int i;
/* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
if (x != NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
/* Sub-packet for status request extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
/* Sub-packet for the ids */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
unsigned char *idbytes;
OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
if (idlen <= 0
/* Sub-packet for an individual id */
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
|| i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
unsigned char *extbytes;
int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
if (extlen < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
|| i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
!= extlen) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*
* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
* for Next Protocol Negotiation
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
/* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
int i, end;
if (clnt == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
/* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
/* Add an empty use_mki value */
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Not defined for client Certificates */
if (x != NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
* comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
*/
if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/*
* Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
*/
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
|| (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
if (nodhe)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
#endif
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
{
unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
size_t encodedlen;
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
*/
key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
} else {
key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
if (key_share_key == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
/* Encode the public key. */
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
&encoded_point);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Create KeyShareEntry */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
* going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
* we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
*/
s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
return 1;
err:
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
return 0;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
size_t i, num_groups = 0;
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
uint16_t curve_id = 0;
/* key_share extension */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
/* Extension data sub-packet */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/* KeyShare list sub-packet */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
* now, just send one
*/
if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
continue;
curve_id = pgroups[i];
break;
}
}
if (curve_id == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
#else
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#endif
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
/* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
/* Extension data sub-packet */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
end:
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
return ret;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
const unsigned char *id = NULL;
size_t idlen = 0;
SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
&& (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
|| (psksess != NULL
&& psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
size_t psklen = 0;
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
} else if (psklen > 0) {
const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
idlen = strlen(identity);
if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
id = (unsigned char *)identity;
/*
* We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
* the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
*/
cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
if (cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
if (psksess == NULL
|| !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
|| !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
|| !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
s->psksession = psksess;
if (psksess != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
s->psksession_id_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
}
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
|| (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
&& (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
s->max_early_data = 0;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
|| (s->ext.hostname != NULL
&& strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
* data.
*/
if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
int found = 0;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
* extension, we set it to accepted.
*/
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
/*
* PSK pre binder overhead =
* 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
* 2 bytes for extension length
* 2 bytes for identities list length
* 2 bytes for identity length
* 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
* 2 bytes for binder list length
* 1 byte for binder length
* The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
* subsequent binder bytes
*/
#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned char *padbytes;
size_t hlen;
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*
* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
* This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
* excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
* this extension MUST always appear second to last.
*/
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
* extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
*/
if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
&& s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
&& s->session->cipher != NULL) {
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
if (md != NULL) {
/*
* Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
* length.
*/
hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
+ EVP_MD_size(md);
}
}
if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
/* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
/*
* Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
* 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
* 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
* 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
*/
if (hlen > 4)
hlen -= 4;
else
hlen = 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/*
* Construct the pre_shared_key extension
*/
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
uint32_t agesec, agems = 0;
size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
int dores = 0;
s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
/*
* Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
* resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
* calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
*/
/*
* If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
* so don't add this extension.
*/
if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
|| (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
/* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
if (mdres == NULL) {
/*
* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
* Ignore it
*/
goto dopsksess;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
/*
* Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
* so we can't use it.
*/
goto dopsksess;
}
/*
* Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
* nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
* implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
* seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
* this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
* issue.
*/
agesec = (uint32_t)(time(NULL) - s->session->time);
/*
* We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
* rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
* better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
* the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
* bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
* happen.
*/
if (agesec > 0)
agesec--;
if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
/* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
goto dopsksess;
}
/*
* Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
* good enough.
*/
agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
/*
* Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
* If so we just ignore it.
*/
goto dopsksess;
}
/*
* Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
* to be mod 2^32.
*/
agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
s->ext.tick_identity++;
dores = 1;
}
dopsksess:
if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->psksession != NULL) {
mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
if (mdpsk == NULL) {
/*
* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
* If this happens it's an application bug.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
/*
* Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
* session. This is an application bug.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
}
/* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (dores) {
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
s->session->ext.ticklen)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (s->psksession != NULL) {
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
s->psksession_id_len)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->ext.tick_identity++;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| (dores
&& !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
|| (s->psksession != NULL
&& !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
/*
* We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
* calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
*/
|| !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
if (dores
&& tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (s->psksession != NULL
&& tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
#else
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#endif
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
if (!s->pha_enabled)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
#else
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#endif
}
/*
* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
size_t ilen;
const unsigned char *data;
/* Check for logic errors */
if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
|| s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
|| !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
|| s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Parse the length byte */
if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
return 0;
}
/* Consistency check */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
return 0;
}
/* Check that the extension matches */
if (ilen != expected_len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
|| memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
|| memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
return 1;
}
/* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int value;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
/* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
/*-
* RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
* response that differs from the length it requested, ...
* It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
*/
if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
/*
* Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
* The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
*/
s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t ecpointformats_len;
PACKET ecptformatlist;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
ecpointformats_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
!s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
/* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
return 1;
}
/*
* MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
* request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
*/
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
* the chain. We ignore any other responses.
*/
if (chainidx != 0)
return 1;
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
}
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->ext.status_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
/* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
return 1;
}
/*
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
* callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
* need to let control continue to flow to that.
*/
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
/* Simply copy it off for later processing */
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
s->ext.scts = NULL;
s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
if (size > 0) {
s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
if (s->ext.scts == NULL) {
s->ext.scts_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
} else {
ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
/*
* If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
* otherwise this is unsolicited.
*/
if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
NULL) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
x, chainidx)) {
/* SSLfatal already called */
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
* elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
* fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET tmp_protocol;
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
|| PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
PACKET tmppkt;
/* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* The data must be valid */
tmppkt = *pkt;
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
PACKET_data(pkt),
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
* a single Serverhello
*/
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
s->ext.npn_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
size_t len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*-
* The extension data consists of:
* uint16 list_length
* uint8 proto_length;
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
|| s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
|| memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)
!= 0) {
/* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
/*
* This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
* initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int id, ct, mki;
int i;
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
|| !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
if (mki != 0) {
/* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
return 0;
}
/* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
if (clnt == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
* presumably offered)
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
if (prof->id == id) {
s->srtp_profile = prof;
return 1;
}
}
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
s->ext.use_etm = 1;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int version;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
* a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
*/
if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
return 0;
}
/* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
return 1;
/* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
s->version = version;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET encoded_pt;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
/* Sanity check */
if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
size_t i, num_groups;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
* already sent in the first ClientHello
*/
if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/* Validate the selected group is one we support */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
if (group_id == pgroups[i])
break;
}
if (i >= num_groups
|| !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
return 1;
}
if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
/*
* This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
* key_share!
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
#endif
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET cookie;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
|| !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
&s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
unsigned long max_early_data;
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
return 1;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
|| !s->hit) {
/*
* If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
* using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
* server should not be accepting it.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int identity;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
return 0;
}
/*
* Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
* ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
* sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
*/
if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
s->hit = 1;
SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
s->psksession = NULL;
return 1;
}
if (s->psksession == NULL) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
* is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
* early_secret across that we generated earlier.
*/
if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
|| s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
|| s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = s->psksession;
s->psksession = NULL;
s->hit = 1;
/* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
if (identity != 0)
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
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