315 lines
9.4 KiB
C
315 lines
9.4 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
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# include <unixio.h>
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#endif
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
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# include <sys/stat.h>
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# include <fcntl.h>
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# if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
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# include <windows.h>
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# include <io.h>
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# define stat _stat
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# define chmod _chmod
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# define open _open
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# define fdopen _fdopen
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# define fstat _fstat
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# define fileno _fileno
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# endif
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#endif
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/*
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* Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
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* and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
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* below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
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* would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
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* is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
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*/
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# if !defined(S_ISREG)
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# define S_ISREG(m) ((m) & S_IFREG)
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# endif
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#define RAND_BUF_SIZE 1024
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#define RFILE ".rnd"
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
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/*
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* __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically)
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* to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what. We know that
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* stdio functions return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it).
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*
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* This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
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* passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89
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*/
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static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
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(__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
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# define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS \
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"shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
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# define openssl_fopen(fname, mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS)
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#endif
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/*
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* Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
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* devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c If |bytes| is
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* -1 read the complete file; otherwise read the specified amount.
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*/
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int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
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{
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/*
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* The load buffer size exceeds the chunk size by the comfortable amount
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* of 'RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH' bytes (not bits!). This is done on purpose
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* to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such
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* a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk
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* (unless it's the only one).
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*/
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#define RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE (RAND_BUF_SIZE + RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH)
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unsigned char buf[RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE];
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
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struct stat sb;
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#endif
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int i, n, ret = 0;
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FILE *in;
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if (bytes == 0)
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return 0;
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if ((in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb")) == NULL) {
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
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return -1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
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if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0) {
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
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fclose(in);
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return -1;
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}
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if (bytes < 0) {
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if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))
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bytes = sb.st_size;
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else
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bytes = RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH;
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation
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* with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here.
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* However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer
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* above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning
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* temporarily.
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*/
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#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
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# pragma environment save
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# pragma message disable maylosedata2
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#endif
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/*
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* Don't buffer, because even if |file| is regular file, we have
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* no control over the buffer, so why would we want a copy of its
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* contents lying around?
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*/
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setbuf(in, NULL);
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#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
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# pragma environment restore
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#endif
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for ( ; ; ) {
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if (bytes > 0)
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n = (bytes <= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE) ? (int)bytes : RAND_BUF_SIZE;
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else
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n = RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE;
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i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
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#ifdef EINTR
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if (ferror(in) && errno == EINTR){
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clearerr(in);
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if (i == 0)
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continue;
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}
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#endif
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if (i == 0)
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break;
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RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i);
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ret += i;
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/* If given a bytecount, and we did it, break. */
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if (bytes > 0 && (bytes -= i) <= 0)
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break;
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}
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OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
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fclose(in);
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if (!RAND_status()) {
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
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return -1;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
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{
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unsigned char buf[RAND_BUF_SIZE];
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int ret = -1;
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FILE *out = NULL;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
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struct stat sb;
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if (stat(file, &sb) >= 0 && !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_NOT_A_REGULAR_FILE);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
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return -1;
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}
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#endif
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/* Collect enough random data. */
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if (RAND_priv_bytes(buf, (int)sizeof(buf)) != 1)
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return -1;
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#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \
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!defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
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{
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# ifndef O_BINARY
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# define O_BINARY 0
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# endif
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/*
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* chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
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* should be restrictive from the start
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*/
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int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
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if (fd != -1)
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out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
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/*
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* VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
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* the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
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* existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
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* as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
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* condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
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* for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
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* the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
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* conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
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* will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
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* and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
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* at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
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* remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
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* concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
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* application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
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* rand file in a concurrent use situation.
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*/
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out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+");
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#endif
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if (out == NULL)
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out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb");
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if (out == NULL) {
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
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return -1;
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}
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#if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
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/*
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* Yes it's late to do this (see above comment), but better than nothing.
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*/
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chmod(file, 0600);
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#endif
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ret = fwrite(buf, 1, RAND_BUF_SIZE, out);
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fclose(out);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, RAND_BUF_SIZE);
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return ret;
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}
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const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
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{
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char *s = NULL;
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size_t len;
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int use_randfile = 1;
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#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
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DWORD envlen;
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WCHAR *var;
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/* Look up various environment variables. */
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if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"RANDFILE", NULL, 0)) == 0) {
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use_randfile = 0;
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if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"HOME", NULL, 0)) == 0
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&& (envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"USERPROFILE",
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NULL, 0)) == 0)
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envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"SYSTEMROOT", NULL, 0);
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}
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/* If we got a value, allocate space to hold it and then get it. */
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if (envlen != 0) {
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int sz;
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WCHAR *val = _alloca(envlen * sizeof(WCHAR));
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if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, envlen) < envlen
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&& (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0,
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NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
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s = _alloca(sz);
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if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz,
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NULL, NULL) == 0)
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s = NULL;
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}
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}
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#else
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if ((s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL || *s == '\0') {
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use_randfile = 0;
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s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME");
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
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if (!use_randfile && s == NULL)
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s = DEFAULT_HOME;
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#endif
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if (s == NULL || *s == '\0')
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return NULL;
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len = strlen(s);
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if (use_randfile) {
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if (len + 1 >= size)
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return NULL;
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strcpy(buf, s);
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} else {
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if (len + 1 + strlen(RFILE) + 1 >= size)
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return NULL;
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strcpy(buf, s);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
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strcat(buf, "/");
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#endif
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strcat(buf, RFILE);
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}
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return buf;
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}
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