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openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c

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v1.1.1t
2023-05-09 22:08:48 +00:00
/*
* Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "statem_local.h"
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
typedef struct {
ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
} GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
/*
* ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
* the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
* The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
* not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
* ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
*/
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
break;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
return 1;
}
break;
} else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
return 1;
}
break;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_OK:
/*
* Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
* early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
*/
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
break;
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
&& s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
}
if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
return 1;
}
break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
return 0;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
* client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
goto err;
return 1;
}
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
break;
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
case TLS_ST_OK:
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
/*
* If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
* 1) We didn't request a Certificate
* OR
* 2) If we did request one then
* a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
* AND
* b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
* list if we requested a certificate)
*/
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
/*
* This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
* not going to accept it because we require a client
* cert.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
/*
* We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
* received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
* will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
* not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
* the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
* set.
*/
if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
*/
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
}
} else {
#endif
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
}
#endif
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
#endif
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
}
err:
/* No valid transition found */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
BIO *rbio;
/*
* CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
* because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
*/
s->init_num = 0;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
return 0;
}
SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
* key exchange.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
/*
* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
* provided
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
|| ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
&& s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
/* For other PSK always send SKE */
|| (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
if (
/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
/*
* don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
* post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
*/
&& (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
|| s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
/*
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* a second time:
*/
&& (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
&& (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
* this for SSL 3)
*/
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
* move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
* client.
*/
static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
* TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
*/
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Try to read from the client instead */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
&& s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
if (s->hit)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
else if (send_certificate_request(s))
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
/*
* Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
* going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
* immediately.
*/
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
} else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
/*
* If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
* handshake at this point.
*/
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
/* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
* Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
* been configured for.
*/
if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
/* We've written enough tickets out. */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
/*
* ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
* to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
* to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
/* We must be trying to renegotiate */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
} else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
} else {
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or SRP */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
} else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
}
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
if (s->ext.status_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
/*
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the server to the client.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
*/
st->use_timer = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
}
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
/*
* Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
* straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
* the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
*
* Calls SSLfatal as required.
*/
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
} if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
break;
/* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
} else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PRE_WORK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
&& (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
{
switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
#if defined(EPIPE)
case EPIPE:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(ECONNRESET)
case ECONNRESET:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
case WSAECONNRESET:
return 1;
#endif
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* server to the client.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
s->init_num = 0;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* No post work to be done */
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
* treat like it was the first packet
*/
s->first_packet = 1;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
&& statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
* SCTP used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
/* Don't include the terminating zero. */
labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
labellen += 1;
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
labellen, NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
|| ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
&& s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
break;
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
if (!statem_flush(s))
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
&& !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
* is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
* handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
*/
s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
break;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
size_t dummy;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
&dummy)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
clear_sys_error();
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
&& conn_is_closed()) {
/*
* We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
* NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
* so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
* that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
* waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
break;
}
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
* server
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
return 0;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
*confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
else
*confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
*confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
*mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
/* No construction function needed */
*confunc = NULL;
*mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
*confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
*confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
*confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
*mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
*confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
*confunc = tls_construct_finished;
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
break;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
*confunc = NULL;
*mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
*confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
*mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
*confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
*mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
break;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
* calculated as follows:
*
* 2 + # client_version
* 32 + # only valid length for random
* 1 + # length of session_id
* 32 + # maximum size for session_id
* 2 + # length of cipher suites
* 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
* 1 + # length of compression_methods
* 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
* 2 + # length of extensions
* 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
*/
#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
/*
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return 0;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
#endif
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
}
}
/*
* Process a message that the server has received from the client.
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
#endif
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
}
}
/*
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the client
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
{
int ret;
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
/*
* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
* login name
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
return -1;
} else {
ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
: SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
return -1;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
size_t cookie_len)
{
/* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned int cookie_leni;
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
&cookie_leni) == 0 ||
cookie_leni > 255) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*-
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* ec_point_formats
* signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
*
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
/* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
unsigned int type;
PACKET sni, tmppkt;
size_t ext_len;
tmppkt = hello->extensions;
if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
return;
}
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
ext_len);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
/* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
|| (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
&& (s->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
}
clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
if (clienthello == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
*/
clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
if (clienthello->isv2) {
unsigned int mt;
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
|| s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
* the rest right through. Its format is:
* Byte Content
* 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
* 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
* 3-4 version
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
* 7-8 session_id_length
* 9-10 challenge_length
* ... ...
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
|| mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
/*
* Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
* in the first place
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
/* Parse the message and load client random. */
if (clienthello->isv2) {
/*
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
* Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
*/
unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
PACKET challenge;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
ciphersuite_len)
|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
/* No extensions. */
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
/* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
* for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
* sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
*/
challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
challenge_len, challenge_len)
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
} else {
/* Regular ClientHello. */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
|| !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
&clienthello->session_id_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
&clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
* just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
* So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
}
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* Could be empty. */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
} else {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
}
}
if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
&clienthello->compressions_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
extensions = clienthello->extensions;
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
&clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
&clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal already been called */
goto err;
}
s->clienthello = clienthello;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
if (clienthello != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int j;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int protverr;
size_t loop;
unsigned long id;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
/* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
/* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
/* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
break;
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
return -1;
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
default:
SSLfatal(s, al,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
}
/* Set up the client_random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* Choose the version */
if (clienthello->isv2) {
if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
|| (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
!= (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
/*
* This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
* support it.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
/* SSLv3/TLS */
s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
}
/*
* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
* versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
} else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
} else {
protverr = 0;
}
if (protverr) {
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
}
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
goto err;
}
/* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto err;
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
} else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
|| memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
}
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
if (protverr != 0) {
s->version = s->client_version;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
goto err;
}
}
}
s->hit = 0;
if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
clienthello->isv2) ||
!bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
/* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
if (scsvs != NULL) {
for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
if (s->renegotiate) {
/* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
goto err;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
} else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
/*
* This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
* a higher version. We should fail if the current version
* is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
* connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
* an insecure downgrade.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto err;
}
}
}
/* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
/*
* A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
* just selected. Something must have changed.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
}
/* We need to do this before getting the session */
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
* TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
* this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
* ignored.
*/
if (clienthello->isv2 ||
(s->new_session &&
(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
if (i == 1) {
/* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
} else {
/* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
s->clienthello->session_id_len);
s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
}
/*
* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
* ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
*/
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto err;
}
}
for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
break;
}
if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
/* no compress */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (!s->hit
&& s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
&& s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
/*
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
* backwards compat reasons
*/
int master_key_length;
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->hit = 1;
s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
if (pref_cipher == NULL)
pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
}
}
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
* the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
* a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
*/
if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
unsigned int k;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto err;
}
} else if (s->hit) {
comp = NULL;
} else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, v, done = 0;
unsigned int o;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (done)
break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto err;
}
#endif
/*
* Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
}
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
s->clienthello = NULL;
return 1;
err:
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
s->clienthello = NULL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
* Upon failure, returns 0.
*/
static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
{
s->ext.status_expected = 0;
/*
* If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
* called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
* and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
* influence which certificate is sent
*/
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
&& s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
int ret;
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
/*
* Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
* et al can pick it up.
*/
s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
switch (ret) {
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
s->ext.status_expected = 0;
break;
/* status request response should be sent */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
s->ext.status_expected = 1;
break;
/* something bad happened */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
default:
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
* Upon failure, returns 0.
*/
int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
unsigned char selected_len = 0;
if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
s->s3->alpn_proposed,
(unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
#endif
/* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
|| selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
|| memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
selected_len) != 0) {
/* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
if (!s->hit) {
/*
* This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
* been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
* selected ALPN.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
selected_len);
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
}
}
return 1;
} else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
return 0;
}
/*
* If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
* present.
*/
}
/* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
/* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
}
return 1;
}
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
if (rv == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() was already called */
goto err;
}
if (rv < 0)
return WORK_MORE_A;
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
/* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
cipher =
ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal already called */
goto err;
}
/* check whether we should disable session resumption */
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
s->session->not_resumable =
s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
if (s->session->not_resumable)
/* do not send a session ticket */
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
}
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
*/
/*
* Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
* certificate callbacks etc above.
*/
if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
* cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
* we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
* we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
*/
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
wst = WORK_MORE_C;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
int ret;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
/*
* callback indicates further work to be done
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_C;
}
if (ret < 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
err:
return WORK_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
int compm;
size_t sl, len;
int version;
unsigned char *session_id;
int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
/*
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
* tls_process_client_hello()
*/
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*-
* There are several cases for the session ID to send
* back in the server hello:
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
* we send back the old session ID.
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
* session ID.
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
* - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
* regardless
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
* to send back.
*/
if (s->session->not_resumable ||
(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
&& !s->hit))
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
if (usetls13) {
sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
} else {
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
session_id = s->session->session_id;
}
if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* set up the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
compm = 0;
#else
if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
compm = 0;
else
compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
|| !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
: (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
: SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
/* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
* a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
*/
if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
} else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
size_t encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
#endif
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
int i;
unsigned long type;
const BIGNUM *r[4];
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
CERT *cert = s->cert;
EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
DH *dh;
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
DH_free(dhp);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
pkdhp = pkdh;
} else {
pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
}
if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
if (pkdh == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pkdhp = pkdh;
}
if (pkdhp == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
if (dh == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
pkdh = NULL;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
if (curve_id == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
/* Generate a new key for this curve */
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key. */
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
&encodedPoint);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
* can set these to NULLs
*/
r[0] = NULL;
r[1] = NULL;
r[2] = NULL;
r[3] = NULL;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
goto err;
}
r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
} else
#endif
{
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
|| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
lu = NULL;
} else if (lu == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_PSK) {
size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
/*
* It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
* checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
*/
if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
unsigned char *binval;
int res;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
} else
#endif
res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
if (!res) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/*-
* for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
* as the prime
*/
if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
if (len > 0) {
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memset(binval, 0, len);
}
}
#endif
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
/*
* We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
* ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
* point itself
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
encodedPoint = NULL;
}
#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (lu != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
size_t siglen, tbslen;
int rv;
if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* send signature algorithm */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
* until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
* up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
* afterwards.
*/
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
|| EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
paramlen);
if (tbslen == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
OPENSSL_free(tbs);
if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
|| sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 1;
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 0;
}
int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
s->pha_context_len = 32;
if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
s->pha_context_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
s->pha_context_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
goto done;
}
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const uint16_t *psigs;
size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
done:
s->certreqs_sent++;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
return 1;
}
static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
size_t psklen;
PACKET psk_identity;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
/*
* PSK related to the given identity not found
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
return 1;
#else
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
size_t j, padding_len;
PACKET enc_premaster;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
/* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
enc_premaster = *pkt;
} else {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
* iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
* (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
* their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
*/
if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/*
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
* the timing-sensitive code below.
*/
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (decrypt_len < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
/*
* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
* are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
* PS is at least 8 bytes.
*/
if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
}
decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
/*
* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
* version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
* Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
* check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
*/
version_good =
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
(unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
version_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
(unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
* protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
* clients.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
(unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
workaround_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
(unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
/*
* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
* remain non-zero (0xff).
*/
decrypt_good &= version_good;
/*
* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
* decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
* contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
*/
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
DH *cdh;
unsigned int i;
BIGNUM *pub_key;
const unsigned char *data;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
/* We already checked we have enough data */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
BN_free(pub_key);
goto err;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* We don't support ECDH client auth */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
} else {
unsigned int i;
const unsigned char *data;
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
/* Get encoded point length */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
unsigned int i;
const unsigned char *data;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
const unsigned char *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
const unsigned char *ptr;
int ret = 0;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
/*
* New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
*/
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
if (pk == NULL) {
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
}
if (pk == NULL) {
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
}
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
* client certificate for authorization only.
*/
client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (client_pub_pkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
/* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
* We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
if (pKX == NULL
|| pKX->kxBlob == NULL
|| ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
inlen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
/* Generate master secret */
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
NULL) > 0)
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
/* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0;
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
/* Don't include the terminating zero. */
labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
labellen += 1;
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
labellen, NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
}
#endif
if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
/*
* No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
* the handshake_buffer
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
* extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
X509 *x = NULL;
unsigned long l;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
PACKET spkt, context;
size_t chainidx;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
/*
* To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
* longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
* TLSv1.3
*/
s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
|| (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
|| (s->pha_context != NULL &&
!PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
if (x == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
PACKET extensions;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
NULL, chainidx == 0)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
rawexts, x, chainidx,
PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
goto err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (i > 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
goto err;
}
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
* we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
* we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
* a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
* session may have already gone into the session cache.
*/
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
sk = NULL;
/*
* Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
* message
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
&s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Resend session tickets */
s->sent_tickets = 0;
}
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
if (cpk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
* for the server Certificate message
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
unsigned char *tick_nonce)
{
uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)s->session->timeout;
/*
* Ticket lifetime hint:
* In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
* timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
* For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
* resumed session (for simplicity).
*/
#define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (s->session->timeout > ONE_WEEK_SEC)
timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
} else if (s->hit)
timeout = 0;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
/* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
unsigned char *tick_nonce)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
int iv_len, ok = 0;
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/*
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (senc == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
*/
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
if (sess == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
/* shouldn't ever happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
/*
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
hctx, 1);
if (ret == 0) {
/* Put timeout and length */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return 1;
}
if (ret < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
} else {
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
|| !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
/* Output key name */
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
/* output IV */
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
&encdata1)
/* Encrypt session data */
|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
|| encdata1 != encdata2
|| !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
|| encdata1 + len != encdata2
|| len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
|| !HMAC_Update(hctx,
(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
macendoffset - macoffset)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
|| macdata1 != macdata2) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return ok;
}
static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
unsigned char *tick_nonce)
{
if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
s->session->session_id_length)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
union {
unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
uint32_t age_add;
} age_add_u;
age_add_u.age_add = 0;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
size_t i, hashlen;
uint64_t nonce;
static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
/*
* If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
* s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
* Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
*/
if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
if (new_sess == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal already called */
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
nonce >>= 8;
}
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
nonce_label,
sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
tick_nonce,
TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
s->session->master_key,
hashlen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
}
s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
}
if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
* is no point in using full stateless tickets.
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
|| (s->max_early_data > 0
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
tick_nonce)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
* gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
* auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
*/
s->sent_tickets++;
s->next_ticket_nonce++;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
}
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
* create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET next_proto, padding;
size_t next_proto_len;
/*-
* The payload looks like:
* uint8 proto_len;
* uint8 proto[proto_len];
* uint8 padding_len;
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
s->ext.npn_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
}
#endif
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
* a record boundary.
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
}