787 lines
23 KiB
Plaintext
787 lines
23 KiB
Plaintext
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=pod
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=head1 NAME
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openssl-verify,
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verify - Utility to verify certificates
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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B<openssl> B<verify>
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[B<-help>]
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[B<-CAfile file>]
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[B<-CApath directory>]
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[B<-no-CAfile>]
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[B<-no-CApath>]
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[B<-allow_proxy_certs>]
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[B<-attime timestamp>]
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[B<-check_ss_sig>]
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[B<-CRLfile file>]
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[B<-crl_download>]
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[B<-crl_check>]
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[B<-crl_check_all>]
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[B<-engine id>]
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[B<-explicit_policy>]
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[B<-extended_crl>]
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[B<-ignore_critical>]
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[B<-inhibit_any>]
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[B<-inhibit_map>]
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[B<-nameopt option>]
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[B<-no_check_time>]
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[B<-partial_chain>]
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[B<-policy arg>]
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[B<-policy_check>]
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[B<-policy_print>]
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[B<-purpose purpose>]
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[B<-suiteB_128>]
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[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
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[B<-suiteB_192>]
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[B<-trusted_first>]
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[B<-no_alt_chains>]
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[B<-untrusted file>]
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[B<-trusted file>]
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[B<-use_deltas>]
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[B<-verbose>]
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[B<-auth_level level>]
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[B<-verify_depth num>]
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[B<-verify_email email>]
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[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
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[B<-verify_ip ip>]
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[B<-verify_name name>]
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[B<-x509_strict>]
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[B<-show_chain>]
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[B<->]
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[certificates]
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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The B<verify> command verifies certificate chains.
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=head1 OPTIONS
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=over 4
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=item B<-help>
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Print out a usage message.
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=item B<-CAfile file>
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A B<file> of trusted certificates.
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The file should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
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=item B<-CApath directory>
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A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names
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of the form: hash.0 or have symbolic links to them of this
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form ("hash" is the hashed certificate subject name: see the B<-hash> option
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of the B<x509> utility). Under Unix the B<c_rehash> script will automatically
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create symbolic links to a directory of certificates.
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=item B<-no-CAfile>
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Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location.
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=item B<-no-CApath>
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Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location.
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=item B<-allow_proxy_certs>
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Allow the verification of proxy certificates.
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=item B<-attime timestamp>
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Perform validation checks using time specified by B<timestamp> and not
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current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
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01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
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=item B<-check_ss_sig>
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Verify the signature of
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the last certificate in a chain if the certificate is supposedly self-signed.
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This is prohibited and will result in an error if it is a non-conforming CA
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certificate with key usage restrictions not including the keyCertSign bit.
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This verification is disabled by default because it doesn't add any security.
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=item B<-CRLfile file>
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The B<file> should contain one or more CRLs in PEM format.
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This option can be specified more than once to include CRLs from multiple
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B<files>.
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=item B<-crl_download>
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Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate.
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=item B<-crl_check>
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Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
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If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
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=item B<-crl_check_all>
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Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
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to look up valid CRLs.
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=item B<-engine id>
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Specifying an engine B<id> will cause L<verify(1)> to attempt to load the
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specified engine.
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The engine will then be set as the default for all its supported algorithms.
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If you want to load certificates or CRLs that require engine support via any of
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the B<-trusted>, B<-untrusted> or B<-CRLfile> options, the B<-engine> option
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must be specified before those options.
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=item B<-explicit_policy>
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Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
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=item B<-extended_crl>
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Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
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signing keys.
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=item B<-ignore_critical>
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Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
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supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
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If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
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=item B<-inhibit_any>
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Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
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=item B<-inhibit_map>
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Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
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=item B<-nameopt option>
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Option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The
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B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by
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commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
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set multiple options. See the L<x509(1)> manual page for details.
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=item B<-no_check_time>
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This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs
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against the current time. If option B<-attime timestamp> is used to specify
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a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
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=item B<-partial_chain>
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Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a
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self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a
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trusted certificate that might not be self-signed.
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=item B<-policy arg>
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Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
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RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
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This argument can appear more than once.
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=item B<-policy_check>
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Enables certificate policy processing.
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=item B<-policy_print>
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Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
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=item B<-purpose purpose>
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The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
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B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
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Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
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B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
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information.
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=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
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Enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
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192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
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See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
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reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
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P-256 and P-384.
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=item B<-trusted_first>
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When constructing the certificate chain, use the trusted certificates specified
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via B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath> or B<-trusted> before any certificates specified via
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B<-untrusted>.
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This can be useful in environments with Bridge or Cross-Certified CAs.
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As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
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=item B<-no_alt_chains>
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By default, unless B<-trusted_first> is specified, when building a certificate
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chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will
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attempt to replace untrusted issuer certificates with certificates from the
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trust store to see if an alternative chain can be found that is trusted.
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As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no
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effect.
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=item B<-untrusted file>
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A B<file> of additional untrusted certificates (intermediate issuer CAs) used
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to construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust-anchor.
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The B<file> should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
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This option can be specified more than once to include untrusted certificates
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from multiple B<files>.
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=item B<-trusted file>
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A B<file> of trusted certificates, which must be self-signed, unless the
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B<-partial_chain> option is specified.
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The B<file> contains one or more certificates in PEM format.
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With this option, no additional (e.g., default) certificate lists are
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consulted.
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That is, the only trust-anchors are those listed in B<file>.
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This option can be specified more than once to include trusted certificates
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from multiple B<files>.
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This option implies the B<-no-CAfile> and B<-no-CApath> options.
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This option cannot be used in combination with either of the B<-CAfile> or
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B<-CApath> options.
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=item B<-use_deltas>
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Enable support for delta CRLs.
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=item B<-verbose>
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Print extra information about the operations being performed.
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=item B<-auth_level level>
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Set the certificate chain authentication security level to B<level>.
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The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and
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public key strength when verifying certificate chains.
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For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
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must meet the specified security B<level>.
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The signature algorithm security level is enforced for all the certificates in
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the chain except for the chain's I<trust anchor>, which is either directly
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trusted or validated by means other than its signature.
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See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
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levels.
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The default security level is -1, or "not set".
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At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
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Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
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interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
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shorter than 1024 bits.
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=item B<-verify_depth num>
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Limit the certificate chain to B<num> intermediate CA certificates.
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A maximal depth chain can have up to B<num+2> certificates, since neither the
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end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the
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B<-verify_depth> limit.
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=item B<-verify_email email>
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Verify if the B<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or
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the email in the subject Distinguished Name.
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=item B<-verify_hostname hostname>
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Verify if the B<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
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Common Name in the subject certificate.
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=item B<-verify_ip ip>
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Verify if the B<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
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the subject certificate.
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=item B<-verify_name name>
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Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate
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policies identified by B<name>.
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The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable
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to verifying the given certificate chain.
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See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options of the L<x509(1)> command-line
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utility.
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Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>,
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B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>.
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These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS
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and S/MIME.
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As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not
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specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the
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corresponding B<-purpose> settings.
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=item B<-x509_strict>
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For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
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certificates.
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=item B<-show_chain>
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Display information about the certificate chain that has been built (if
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successful). Certificates in the chain that came from the untrusted list will be
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flagged as "untrusted".
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=item B<->
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Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
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certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
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with a B<->.
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=item B<certificates>
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One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given, B<verify>
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will attempt to read a certificate from standard input. Certificates must be
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in PEM format.
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=back
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=head1 VERIFY OPERATION
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The B<verify> program uses the same functions as the internal SSL and S/MIME
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verification, therefore, this description applies to these verify operations
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too.
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There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed
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by the B<verify> program: wherever possible an attempt is made to continue
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after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the
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first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be
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determined.
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The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps.
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Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate
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and ending in the root CA.
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It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up.
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The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current
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certificate.
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If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed to be the root
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CA.
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The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number of
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steps.
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After all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current
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certificate are subject to further tests.
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The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate (if
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present) must match the subject key identifier (if present) and issuer and
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serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of
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the candidate issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing.
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The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match
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is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA
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is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to
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verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted
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list.
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The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for
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consistency with the supplied purpose. If the B<-purpose> option is not included
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then no checks are done. The supplied or "leaf" certificate must have extensions
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compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid
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CA certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in
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the B<CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS> section of the B<x509> utility.
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The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root CA
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should be trusted for the supplied purpose.
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For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate with no
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trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
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The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain.
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For each element in the chain, including the root CA certificate,
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the validity period as specified by the C<notBefore> and C<notAfter> fields
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is checked against the current system time.
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The B<-attime> flag may be used to use a reference time other than "now."
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The certificate signature is checked as well
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(except for the signature of the typically self-signed root CA certificate,
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which is verified only if the B<-check_ss_sig> option is given).
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If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If
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any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
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=head1 DIAGNOSTICS
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When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The
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general form of the error message is:
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server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
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error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate
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The first line contains the name of the certificate being verified followed by
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the subject name of the certificate. The second line contains the error number
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and the depth. The depth is number of the certificate being verified when a
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problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itself
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then 1 for the CA that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version
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of the error number is presented.
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A partial list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also
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includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h
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Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described
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as "unused".
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=over 4
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=item B<X509_V_OK>
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The operation was successful.
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=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED>
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Unspecified error; should not happen.
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=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT>
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The issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This
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normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
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=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL>
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The CRL of a certificate could not be found.
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||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the
|
||
|
actual signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching
|
||
|
the expected value, this is only meaningful for RSA keys.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual
|
||
|
signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the
|
||
|
expected value. Unused.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the
|
||
|
current time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the
|
||
|
current time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The CRL is not yet valid.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The CRL has expired.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM>
|
||
|
|
||
|
An error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The passed certificate is self-signed and the same certificate cannot
|
||
|
be found in the list of trusted certificates.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates
|
||
|
but the root could not be found locally.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer
|
||
|
certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
No signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one
|
||
|
certificate and it is not self signed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum
|
||
|
depth. Unused.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The certificate has been revoked.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA>
|
||
|
|
||
|
A CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions
|
||
|
are not consistent with the supplied purpose.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
The root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||
|
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||
|
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||
|
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||
|
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unable to get CRL issuer certificate.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unhandled critical extension.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Key usage does not include CRL signing.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unhandled critical CRL extension.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Invalid non-CA certificate has CA markings.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Proxy path length constraint exceeded.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_INVALID>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Proxy certificate subject is invalid. It MUST be the same as the issuer
|
||
|
with a single CN component added.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Key usage does not include digital signature.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Proxy certificates not allowed, please use B<-allow_proxy_certs>.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Invalid or inconsistent certificate extension.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY>
|
||
|
|
||
|
No explicit policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Different CRL scope.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unsupported extension feature.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Permitted subtree violation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Excluded subtree violation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Name constraints minimum and maximum not supported.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Application verification failure. Unused.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unsupported name constraint type.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unsupported or invalid name syntax.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR>
|
||
|
|
||
|
CRL path validation error.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Path loop.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suite B: certificate version invalid.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suite B: invalid public key algorithm.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suite B: invalid ECC curve.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suite B: invalid signature algorithm.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hostname mismatch.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Email address mismatch.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
|
||
|
IP address mismatch.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH>
|
||
|
|
||
|
DANE TLSA authentication is enabled, but no TLSA records matched the
|
||
|
certificate chain.
|
||
|
This error is only possible in L<s_client(1)>.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL>
|
||
|
|
||
|
EE certificate key too weak.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL>
|
||
|
|
||
|
CA certificate key too weak.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK>
|
||
|
|
||
|
CA signature digest algorithm too weak.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL>
|
||
|
|
||
|
nvalid certificate verification context.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Issuer certificate lookup error.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Certificate Transparency required, but no valid SCTs found.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Proxy subject name violation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Returned by the verify callback to indicate an OCSP verification is needed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Returned by the verify callback to indicate OCSP verification failed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN>
|
||
|
|
||
|
Returned by the verify callback to indicate that the certificate is not recognized
|
||
|
by the OCSP responder.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=back
|
||
|
|
||
|
=head1 BUGS
|
||
|
|
||
|
Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old
|
||
|
technique they still suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP
|
||
|
API. One consequence of this is that trusted certificates with matching
|
||
|
subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the B<-CAfile>
|
||
|
option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>). If they occur in
|
||
|
both then only the certificates in the file will be recognised.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject
|
||
|
name are identical and mishandled them.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Previous versions of this documentation swapped the meaning of the
|
||
|
B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT> and
|
||
|
B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=head1 SEE ALSO
|
||
|
|
||
|
L<x509(1)>
|
||
|
|
||
|
=head1 HISTORY
|
||
|
|
||
|
The B<-show_chain> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
|
||
|
is silently ignored.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=head1 COPYRIGHT
|
||
|
|
||
|
Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||
|
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||
|
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||
|
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
|
||
|
|
||
|
=cut
|